Trading Places Game Theory [on hold]
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I have got the following question from the Tadelis book "Game Theory: An Introduction", Question 12.7:
Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player $i$ values his own house at $v_i$. The value of player $i$'s house to the other player, i.e., to player $j neq i$, is $frac{3}{2} v_i$. Each player $i$ knows the value $v_i$ of his own house to himself, but not the value of the other player's house. the values $v_i$ are drawn independently from the interval $[0, 1]$ with uniform distribution.
Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to exchange their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange takes places. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player $i$ accepts an exchange if and only if the value $v_i$ does not exceed some threshold $theta_i$.
game-theory
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
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put on hold as off-topic by caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797 2 days ago
This question appears to be off-topic. The users who voted to close gave this specific reason:
- "This question is missing context or other details: Please improve the question by providing additional context, which ideally includes your thoughts on the problem and any attempts you have made to solve it. This information helps others identify where you have difficulties and helps them write answers appropriate to your experience level." – caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797
If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.
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I have got the following question from the Tadelis book "Game Theory: An Introduction", Question 12.7:
Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player $i$ values his own house at $v_i$. The value of player $i$'s house to the other player, i.e., to player $j neq i$, is $frac{3}{2} v_i$. Each player $i$ knows the value $v_i$ of his own house to himself, but not the value of the other player's house. the values $v_i$ are drawn independently from the interval $[0, 1]$ with uniform distribution.
Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to exchange their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange takes places. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player $i$ accepts an exchange if and only if the value $v_i$ does not exceed some threshold $theta_i$.
game-theory
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
put on hold as off-topic by caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797 2 days ago
This question appears to be off-topic. The users who voted to close gave this specific reason:
- "This question is missing context or other details: Please improve the question by providing additional context, which ideally includes your thoughts on the problem and any attempts you have made to solve it. This information helps others identify where you have difficulties and helps them write answers appropriate to your experience level." – caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797
If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.
add a comment |
up vote
0
down vote
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up vote
0
down vote
favorite
I have got the following question from the Tadelis book "Game Theory: An Introduction", Question 12.7:
Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player $i$ values his own house at $v_i$. The value of player $i$'s house to the other player, i.e., to player $j neq i$, is $frac{3}{2} v_i$. Each player $i$ knows the value $v_i$ of his own house to himself, but not the value of the other player's house. the values $v_i$ are drawn independently from the interval $[0, 1]$ with uniform distribution.
Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to exchange their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange takes places. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player $i$ accepts an exchange if and only if the value $v_i$ does not exceed some threshold $theta_i$.
game-theory
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
I have got the following question from the Tadelis book "Game Theory: An Introduction", Question 12.7:
Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player $i$ values his own house at $v_i$. The value of player $i$'s house to the other player, i.e., to player $j neq i$, is $frac{3}{2} v_i$. Each player $i$ knows the value $v_i$ of his own house to himself, but not the value of the other player's house. the values $v_i$ are drawn independently from the interval $[0, 1]$ with uniform distribution.
Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to exchange their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange takes places. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player $i$ accepts an exchange if and only if the value $v_i$ does not exceed some threshold $theta_i$.
game-theory
game-theory
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
edited 2 days ago
caverac
11.9k21027
11.9k21027
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
asked 2 days ago
Patrice Mele
41
41
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Patrice Mele is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
put on hold as off-topic by caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797 2 days ago
This question appears to be off-topic. The users who voted to close gave this specific reason:
- "This question is missing context or other details: Please improve the question by providing additional context, which ideally includes your thoughts on the problem and any attempts you have made to solve it. This information helps others identify where you have difficulties and helps them write answers appropriate to your experience level." – caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797
If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.
put on hold as off-topic by caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797 2 days ago
This question appears to be off-topic. The users who voted to close gave this specific reason:
- "This question is missing context or other details: Please improve the question by providing additional context, which ideally includes your thoughts on the problem and any attempts you have made to solve it. This information helps others identify where you have difficulties and helps them write answers appropriate to your experience level." – caverac, Paul Frost, John B, user10354138, user302797
If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.
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